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Emerson v. Dist. Ct., 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 61 (October 6, 2011)1 
CIVIL PROCEDURE – WRIT RELIEF AND SANCTIONS 
Summary 
An original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging a district court 
order imposing sanctions on the petitioner, an attorney.  
Disposition / Outcome 
 The Supreme Court denied writ relief because the district court has broad power to award 
sanctions. Furthermore, a sanction awarding the harmed party costs and attorney fees is 
appropriate if the attorney misconduct resulted in awarding the harmed party a new trial. 
Factual / Procedural History 
 The issue before the Court arose from a multivehicle accident and the subsequent dispute 
over fault for the incident.2 Gregory Lioce (“Lioce”) sued Dana Cohen, Morry Cohen, and John 
Wilson (“Wilson”).3 Petitioner, Phillip Emerson (“Emerson”), while defending Wilson at trial, 
made a series of improper statements to the jury.4 After the jury verdict in favor of the 
defendants, Lioce moved for a directed verdict or a new trial because of Emerson’s improper 
statements.5 The district court denied Lioce’s motions.6 Lioce challenged this ruling to the 
Supreme Court of Nevada.7 The Court held that Emerson’s comments “were improper and 
amounted to impermissible jury nullification,” vacated the district court’s order denying a new 
trial, and remanded the matter to the district court with instructions.8 
 On remand, the district court granted Lioce a new trial with respect to Wilson because 
Wilson’s attorney’s remarks at trial affected the jury’s verdict as to Wilson’s fault. Lioce filed a 
motion for sanctions of attorney fees and costs based on Emerson’s misconduct. The district 
court orally granted Lioce sanctions in the amount of attorney’s fees and costs related to the first 
trial in July 2009. In August 2009, the parties filed a stipulation and order dismissing the matter 
with prejudice, and the court entered the order. In September 2009, the district court entered an 
order imposing $19,330 in sanctions on Emerson, personally, based on Lioce’s declaration of 
costs and attorney fees from the original trial. Emerson petitioned the Supreme Court for writ 
relief after the district court denied Emerson’s motion for reconsideration, arguing that the 
district court improperly imposed sanctions against him. 
 
Discussion 
 Justice Hardesty wrote for the unanimous three-justice panel and denied Emerson’s writ 
petition.  The Court determined that a writ was unwarranted because (1) the district court has 
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jurisdiction to consider sanctions, and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding sanctions for Emerson’s misconduct.  Emerson raised a question of first impression 
before the Court, whether the district court retains jurisdiction to consider sanctions following 
the voluntary dismissal of a case. Emerson was not a party to the litigation in the lower court and 
could not appeal the district court’s decision. Thus, a writ was his only remedy available at law. 
 The Court held that the district court has jurisdiction to consider sanctions even after the 
parties’ voluntary dismissal because “allowing the district court to retain jurisdiction to impose 
sanctions is consistent with other jurisdictions’ rational for sanctioning attorney misconduct.”9  
Federal courts may impose sanctions for attorney misconduct under FRCP 11 after parties file a 
voluntary dismissal notice.10  
Attorney misconduct and sanctions are distinct from adjudicating the merits of a case 
because behavior that results in attorney sanctions is both unrelated to the merits of the case and 
an insult to the judicial process. Although the district court’s jurisdiction related to the merits of 
a case ends upon the case’s dismissal,11 the sanctions the district court filed against Emerson 
were unrelated to the merits of the underlying case and related only to Emerson’s misconduct. 
 Further, the Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
sanctions for Emerson’s misconduct in the amount of Lioce’s fees and costs because district 
courts have inherent powers and broad discretion to sanction attorneys for trial misconduct.12 
Sanctions, however, must be proportionate to the litigant’s misconduct.13 Emerson argued that a 
sanction totaling the costs and fees incurred by Lioce at the first trial was not proportionate to 
Emerson’s misconduct. The Court was not persuaded, however, because Emerson’s 
inappropriate statements directly resulted in Lioce’s new trial.  Thus, the Court held that 
Emerson’s sanction was proportional to his conduct. 
Conclusion 
 The district court retains jurisdiction after a case’s dismissal to order sanctions against 
attorneys for misconduct at trial.  The district court has broad power to award sanctions, and a 
sanction awarding the harmed party costs and attorney fees is appropriate if the attorney 
misconduct resulted in awarding the harmed party a new trial. 
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